das Egypt Air die Unfallanalyse des NTSB nicht akzeptiert ist verständlich.

Der komplette Unfallbericht ist hier zu lesen.

https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/fulltext/AAB0201.html

Speziell die folgenden zwei Absätze des Berichts, denke ich, sprechen für sich:

At 0149:48, the relief first officer again quietly stated, "I rely on God." At 0149:53, the throttle levers were retarded (moved from their cruise power setting to idle). This throttle lever movement occurred at a rate that was more than twice that which the autothrottle can command. Further, the throttle levers moved 10º to 15º beyond the minimum position that the autothrottle would have been able to command at the existing flight conditions to the throttle levers' full aft idle stop, about 33º.¹⁰⁸ Movement of the throttles aft of the autothrottle commanded position requires a manually applied force of about 9 pounds on the throttle levers to override the autothrottle servomotor clutch. Thus, it is apparent that the throttle lever movements at 0149:53 were caused by the relief first officer's manual inputs and were not the result of autothrottle commands.¹⁰⁹

At 0149:54, the FDR recorded a very slight movement of the inboard ailerons and both elevator surfaces beginning to rapidly pitch nose down (to about 3.6° nose-down deflection). The nose-down elevator movement began after the throttle levers started to move to idle; therefore, the relief first officer did not move the throttle levers to idle in response to the nose-down elevator movement. As previously noted, the relief first officer did not audibly express surprise or seem anxious or disturbed by the airplane's sudden and extreme nose-down movement or the reduction in load factor to near 0 G, nor did he call for help during the accident sequence. Again, there was no evidence in the CVR, FDR, ATC, or radar data of any system malfunction, conflicting air traffic, or other event that would have prompted the relief first officer to adjust the throttle levers at all, let alone take an action as drastic as moving the throttle levers to the idle position while in cruise flight at night over the ocean or to then command a sustained nose-down elevator movement.

Auch das Verhalten des Relief First Officers nach Rückkehr des Captains ist sympomatisch für sein Ansinnen, bitte selber lesen:

Events After the Command Captain Returned to the Cockpit

Der folgende Bericht gibt noch einige lesenswerte Passagen des CVR:

https://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2002/AAB0201.pdf

War das möglicherweise der Ideengeber für den 9/11?

Gruß

Horst Riediger